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Recent Developments 
A Failure to Comply: An Initial 
Assessment of Gaps in IOM’s Medical 
Device Study Committee 
Ralph F. Hall* & Eva Stensvad** 
“With great power comes great responsibility”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In addition to addressing traditional scientific and clinical 
inquiries, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) is engaged in policy 
analysis and recommendations.2 Because of IOM’s strong 
reputation,3 IOM committees play a powerful role in public 
policy. Yet, despite this power, IOM committees operate in a 
largely closed fashion. IOM alone determines committee 
membership.4 Committee deliberations are private.5 Policy 
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 1. Tammany is Satisfied: Mr. Gilroy Interviewed at New Orleans, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1892. 
 2. About the IOM, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last 
updated May 1, 2011). 
 3. Cf. Membership, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/About-
IOM/Membership.aspx (last updated April 2, 2011). 
 4. NAT’L ACADS., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE: CHARTER AND BYLAWS 3 
(2006), available at 
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recommendations need not be publicly vetted before being 
issued in final form.6 IOM decides how to operate, what 
testimony to elicit, and what studies to conduct.7 Conversely, 
government committees and policy development operate in a 
much more public and transparent fashion.8 
Because of its great power, IOM has a great responsibility 
to ensure that its processes and committee membership include 
all key stakeholders, are fair and unbiased, and are viewed as 
such. The strength of IOM committee recommendations 
depends on the quality and completeness of its research and 
analysis and, equally importantly, on stakeholder acceptance of 
the fairness and robustness of its processes. A committee that 
lacks essential expertise and key stakeholder involvement risks 
not only producing a report and recommendations that are 
incomplete or incorrect, but also producing a report that lacks 
the trust of stakeholders. 
Unfortunately, IOM’s Committee on the Public Health 
Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process has been 
subject to substantial criticism for not being inclusive or open.9 
More importantly, the Committee has been roundly criticized 
for major gaps or omissions in committee membership.10 The 
shortcomings with this Committee’s composition and processes 
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/About%20the%20IOM/charter-and-
bylaws.pdf (“The membership of committees conducting studies and preparing 
reports for dissemination outside the Institute and the National Research 
Council shall be appointed by the President, subject to approval by the 
Chairman of the National Research Council.”). 
 5. Federal Advisory Committee Act, INST. MED., 
http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM/Study-Process/FACA.aspx (last updated Feb. 
8, 2011). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Policies and Procedures, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/NRC/PoliciesandProcedures/index.htm (last 
visited May 9, 2011). 
 8. WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40520, FEDERAL 
ADVISORY COMMITTEES: AN OVERVIEW (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40520.pdf. 
 9. See, e.g., Impact of Medical Device Regulation on Jobs and Patients: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 112th Cong. 62 (2011), available at 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/image_uploads/
Transcript_MedDevice.pdf (preliminary transcript) (questioning the 
composition of the IOM panel). 
 10. Id.; see also Letter from Sen. John Kerry to Margaret Ann Hamburg, 
Commissioner, Food & Drug Admin. (Apr. 13, 2011). 
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threaten the strength of the analysis and stakeholders’ 
acceptance of its recommendations. These issues are so serious 
that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may be 
legally prohibited from using any of the 510(k) Committee’s 
recommendations. 
This article questions whether IOM’s 510(k) Committee 
complies with statutory requirements and good process. We do 
not yet know the Committee’s recommendations, and so our 
concerns are not influenced by any disagreement with the 
Committee’s conclusions. We also are not questioning the 
talents of current Committee members—individually they have 
impressive credentials and specific subject matter expertise. 
Rather, we question the omissions from the Committee of 
essential expertise and stakeholders. These critical issues 
should be addressed immediately to preserve IOM’s reputation, 
ensure fairness, and permit FDA to use the Committee’s report. 
This article contends that, while the IOM can be an 
invaluable policy resource, IOM’s 510(k) Committee, 
unfortunately, does not comply with federal law. Therefore, 
FDA is legally prohibited from using any report from this IOM 
Committee when deciding what changes to make to the 510(k) 
process. In order to prevent problems, it may be best for IOM 
not to issue any report from this Committee until these issues 
get resolved. 
II. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE IOM 510(K) 
COMMITTEE 
FDA is responsible for advancing the public health by 
providing reasonable assurance that medical devices are safe 
and effective and also by promoting innovation.11 Assuring 
safety and efficacy for patients entails expensive and time-
consuming approval processes, while promoting innovation 
requires making beneficial medical devices available to 
physicians and patients faster and less expensively. FDA 
balances these two goals—patient protection and innovation—
through its approval processes. The device is first assigned to 
one of three risk-based classifications. This classification 
 11. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2006); 
What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/default.htm (last updated Nov. 18, 
2010). 
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determines the applicable FDA approval process.12 
High-risk medical devices13 are subject to Premarket 
Approval (PMA),14 a rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive 
process.15 In comparison, moderate-risk devices16 can be 
cleared for market through the faster and less resource-
intensive Premarket Notification (PMN) or “510(k)” clearance 
process.17 The 510(k) process allows a new device to enter the 
market if the new device is “substantially equivalent” to a 
510(k) product already legally on the market (a “predicate” 
device).18 Many more products go through the 510(k) process 
than the PMA process.19 Furthermore, because the 510(k) 
 12. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006). 
 13. High-risk, or “Class III,” medical devices are those for which 
“insufficient information exists to determine that the application of general 
controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and 
effectiveness” and typically include devices that are “purported or represented 
to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of 
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health” or “[which 
present] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” 21 U.S.C. § 
360c(a)(1)(c) (2006). Examples of high-risk devices approved through the PMA 
process include heart valves and implantable pacemakers. General and 
Special Controls, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/G
eneralandSpecialControls/ucm2005378.htm (last updated Apr. 23, 2009). 
 14. 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2006). 




 16. Low-risk, or “Class I,” medical devices are those for which general 
controls, such as manufacturing practices, are adequate to ensure safety and 
effectiveness. 21 C.F.R. § 850.2(c)(1). Moderate-risk, or “Class II,” medical 
devices are those for which both general and specific controls, including 
postmarket surveillance and additional FDA guidelines, are required to 
ensure safety and effectiveness. Id. § 860.3(c)(2). 
 17. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2006). Products cleared through the 510(k) process 
include angioplasty catheters and blood glucose monitors. 510(k) Premarket 
Notification, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm (last 
updated May 9, 2011). 
 18. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (2006). 
 19. In 2009, FDA received more than 3500 510(k) applications as 
compared to 20 original PMA applications and 1394 PMA supplements. U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, OFFICE 
OF DEVICE EVALUATION, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009 4 
(2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports
/UCM223893.pdf. 
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system requires a less detailed submission to the FDA than is 
required for PMA, 510(k) clearances are generally faster than 
PMA approvals.20 
Each system assesses the safety and efficacy of the product 
as part of the FDA’s statutory mandate to provide a 
“reasonable assurance” that a product is safe and effective 
before marketing.21 The 510(k) process makes this safety and 
effectiveness determination by assessing whether the product 
in question is “substantially equivalent” to a 510(k) device 
already legally marketed.22 In some cases clinical data is 
needed for the 510(k) submission. In other cases, bench testing 
or compliance with existing government-approved standards is 
used to establish safety and effectiveness.23 
The 510(k) process has been criticized by a number of 
stakeholders. Some argue that the pathway is too easy, 
allowing unsafe, ineffective, or inadequately tested devices on 
the market.24 These stakeholders may argue that all 510(k) 
products should be subject to placebo controlled, blinded 
clinical trials.25 Conversely, others argue that it is 
unpredictable and burdensome, unnecessarily inhibiting 
innovation and patient/physician access to new products.26 For 
these reasons, in September 2009, FDA launched a review of 
the 510(k) process. As part of this review, FDA commissioned 
 20. See id. at 4–9. 
 21. 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2006). 
 22. Id. § 360c(i). 
 23. For examples, see presentations made at the third public meeting of 
the 510(k) Committee on July 28, 2010, available at Meeting 3: Public Health 
Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process, INST. MED., 
http://www.iom.edu/Activities/PublicHealth/510KProcess/2010-JUL-28.aspx 
(last updated July 28, 2010). 
 24. See, e.g., Jonas Zajac Hines et al., Left to Their Own Devices: 
Breakdowns in United States Medical Device Premarket Review, 87 AM. J. 
HUM. GENETICS 451 (2010); Comments on FDA 510(k) Medical Devices 
Working Group Preliminary Report and Recommendations, PUB. CITIZEN, 
http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=4535 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
 25. See Rita Redberg, Presentation to the Committee on the Public Health 
Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process (July 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/PublicHealth/510kProcess/
2010-JUL-28/02%20Redberg.pdf. 
 26. See, e.g., JOSH MAKOWER ET AL., FDA IMPACT ON U.S. MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION: A SURVEY OF OVER 200 MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 
COMPANIES (2010), available at 
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid
=668&Itemid=93. 
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the IOM to conduct a detailed analysis of the 510(k) system.27 
As a body of the U.S. National Academies, the IOM is intended 
to provide the federal government and others with expert, 
independent analysis and recommendations about issues of 
health and heath care.28 
In the spring of 2010, IOM created a committee to conduct 
this review—with IOM itself deciding the committee’s 
membership.29 The committee held three workshops with 
invited speakers and allowed other interested parties five 
minutes apiece to address the committee.30 Other than asking 
clarifying questions, the committee did not engage in any 
dialogue about specific policy recommendations. The committee 
met a number of times in closed session where, presumably, it 
debated policy issues and recommendations.31 The committee 
also reviewed submitted material, the content of which is not 
public. Finally, according to IOM procedures, there will be no 
public input into or discussion of IOM recommendations prior 
to the final report.32 
In January 2011, FDA reported twenty-five actions it is 
 27. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA: Institute of Medicine 




 28. See COMM. ON THE PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 
510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS, PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA 
510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS: BALANCING PATIENT SAFETY AND INNOVATION: 
WORKSHOP REPORT, at iv (Theresa Wizemann ed. 2010), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12960&page=R1 (“The Institute 
acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its 
congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government . . . .”); see 
also About the IOM, supra note 4. 
 29. Our Study Process, NAT’L ACAS., 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/studyprocess/index.html#st2 (last visited 
May 9, 2011). 
 30. See Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process, 
INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/Activities/PublicHealth/510KProcess.aspx 
(last visited April 25, 2011) [hereinafter Public Health Effectiveness]. 
 31. Project: Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance 
Process, NAT’L ACADS., 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=IOM-BPH-09-03 
(last visited May 9, 2011) [hereinafter Project]. 
 32. See Our Study Process, supra note 31; see also Federal Advisory 
Committee Act, supra note 7 (“All analyses and drafts of the report remain 
confidential.”). 
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considering to improve the 510(k) program.33 Importantly, FDA 
reconfirmed the importance of the IOM committee report when 
it specifically referred seven controversial questions to IOM for 
analysis and recommendations.34 IOM is expected to issue its 
final report in the late spring or summer of 2011.35 
III. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR IOM COMMITTEE 
MEMBERSHIP 
IOM studies of this type are not conducted in a legal 
vacuum. Section 15 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
(FACA) sets forth rules governing FDA’s use of IOM studies.36 
Enacted in 1972, FACA requires federal advisory committees to 
operate openly, efficiently, and objectively to ensure accuracy, 
fairness, and public trust.37 When federal agencies like the 
FDA solicit advice from the National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS), which includes IOM, the requirements of FACA section 
15 apply. Section 15 imposes fewer requirements on IOM 
committees than other federal advisory committees,38 but still 
requires minimal inclusivity and public accountability. Section 
15 requires fair balance on committees, public notice of 
meetings, openness of data-gathering meetings, and public 
availability of records.39 Because there are fewer rules IOM 
committees must follow, those rules that do exist take on 
heightened importance to ensure transparency, fairness, and 
public input. IOM’s own policies and procedures echo (albeit 
with more detail) these same basic tenets.40 If the 510(k) 
committee fails to meet these rules, then, by statute, FDA “may 
not use any advice or recommendation” provided by this 
committee.41 
Section 15 requires that IOM “make its best efforts to 
 33. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL 
HEALTH, PLAN OF ACTION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 510(K) AND SCIENCE 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2011), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports
/UCM239450.pdf. 
 34. Id. at 6. 
 35. See Project, supra note 33. 
 36. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2, § 15 (2006). 
 37. See id. §§ 5–14. 
 38. Compare id. § 15 (setting forth requirements for NAS committees), 
with id. §§ 5–14 (setting forth requirements for federal advisory committees). 
 39. See id § 15(b). 
 40. See Our Study Process, supra note 31. 
 41. 5 U.S.C. app. 2, § 15(a). 
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ensure that . . . the committee membership is fairly balanced . . 
. for the functions to be performed.”42 The committee should not 
contain any individual with a conflict of interest, unless the 
conflict is “unavoidable” and is “promptly and publicly 
disclosed.”43 Any IOM committee that lacks fair balance or that 
mishandles conflicts of interest fails to comply with section 15.  
It is important to note that section 15 vests a great deal of 
discretion in the NAS, stating that “[t]he Academy shall make 
its best efforts” to ensure the adequacy of the committee’s 
composition and that the Academy determines whether a 
conflict is unavoidable.44 Additionally, the Academy is 
responsible for determining whether “the committee 
membership is fairly balanced . . . to be appropriate for the 
functions to be performed.”45 Furthermore, the Chair of the 
National Research Council (NRC) has “[f]inal authority over 
committee appointments,”46 and the NRC Executive Office and 
the General Counsel’s Office jointly determine whether there is 
a conflict of interest and whether that conflict is unavoidable.47 
This discretion, however, is not unfettered. 
First, FACA clearly states that, while conflicts of interest 
are permissible at the Academy’s discretion, fair balance is 
necessary. Furthermore, courts, while generally deferential,48 
have on occasion intervened when committees are 
unbalanced.49 While no cases involving an NAS committee’s 
fair balance have yet been brought to court, there have been 
cases that challenge traditional federal advisory committees 
subject to section 5 of FACA, which, similarly to section 15, 
 42. Id. § 15(b)(1). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. § 15(b)(1)(A). 
 45. Id. § 15(b)(1)(B). 
 46. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION AND BALANCE 
AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR COMMITTEES USED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
REPORTS 7 (2003), available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/coi/bi-
coi_form-0.pdf. 
 47. Id. at 8. 
 48. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 
1999) (explaining that the fair balance requirement is “subject to a deferential 
standard of review”). 
 49. See, e.g., Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Dep’t of Interior, 26 
F.3d 1103 (11th Cir.) (upholding an injunction where a committee tasked with 
deciding whether to list a particular species of fish as endangered did not 
include any representatives who had an economic interest in that fish 
market). 
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requires fair balance in committee membership.50 In cases 
implicating section 5, courts look at the specific functions of the 
committees to decide whether there is fair balance. When a 
committee is charged with a narrow, scientific, or highly 
technical mandate, fewer viewpoints and areas of expertise 
may be required on the committee.51 Where the functions to be 
performed are not “narrow and explicit,”52 but instead involve 
“diverse and far-reaching issues that affect others,” broader 
representation on the committee is required.53 This is 
especially true of committees whose purpose is “to study the 
effects of a particular type of regulation . . . on the public.”54 
The key issues in evaluating compliance with FACA, then, 
are first determining the committee’s function, and then 
figuring out what areas of expertise are required on the 
committee to fulfill that function. Importantly, the statutory 
requirement of fair balance applies specifically to committee 
membership. IOM cannot satisfy this requirement through 
other input mechanisms. For example, a lack of balance on the 
committee cannot be remedied simply by allowing missing 
stakeholders to submit data, make presentations, or serve as 
peer reviewers. If these were acceptable alternatives to fair 
balance on the committee, then the statute would not explicitly 
require such balance on IOM committees themselves. Inclusion 
of necessary experts and viewpoints during the data-gathering 
and reviewing processes is important, but cannot substitute for 
balance among the committee membership. Since the 
committee itself privately decides on the content of the final 
report and recommendations, balance and expertise is required 
on the committee. Anything less violates the statutory 
requirements. 
The National Academies’ own internal policies regarding 
 50. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2). Generally, it is fair to presume that Congress 
intends a consistent meaning of a phrase when it uses that phrase in several 
parts of the same statute. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 
(1994) (“A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally 
read the same way each time it appears.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 
708 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 1988). 
 52. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private 
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 53. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
No. C99-1165R, 1999 WL 33526001, *7 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
 54. Pub. Citizen, 708 F. Supp. at 364. 
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committee member selection, fair balance, conflicts of interest, 
and bias reflect the legal requirements of FACA section 15. 
They require that committees contain an “appropriate range of 
expertise for the task” and a “balance of perspectives,” while 
striving to avoid conflicts of interest where possible.55 These 
policies permit committees to include members who are biased 
or have expressed a strong opinion on a particular issue of 
interest. According to the NAS process for committee 
appointment, “[a] point of view or bias is not necessarily a 
conflict of interest.”56 IOM recognizes that member bias is not 
only permissible, it is sometimes necessary. According to the 
NAS Policy on Committee Composition and Balance, “[f]or 
some studies . . . it may be important to have an ‘industrial’ 
perspective” if such a perspective is “vital to achieving an 
informed, comprehensive, and authoritative understanding and 
analysis of the specific problems and potential solutions to be 
considered by the committee.”57 However, IOM must balance 
these perspectives to produce an overall objective committee 
and avoid bias or the perception of bias. If these individuals 
have conflicts of interest, they may nevertheless be included on 
the committee to provide needed expertise, knowledge, balance, 
or perspective. In such cases, the conflict of interest is 
“unavoidable” and simply must be disclosed.58 
A brief examination of recent IOM activities reveals a 
number of committees in which industry members and/or 
members with conflicts of interest were included. Out of ten 
current or recent FDA-sponsored IOM activities, at least half 
contain members with industry background and at least three 
committees contain members with disclosed conflicts of 
interest.59 For example, the IOM committee on Qualification of 
 55. NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS: ENSURING INDEPENDENT, 
OBJECTIVE ADVICE 2 (n.d.), available at 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/studycommitteprocess.pdf. 
 56. Committee Appointment Process, NAT’L ACADS., 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/information.aspx?key=Committee_Appo
intment (last visited April 25, 2011). 
 57. NAT’L ACADS., supra note 48 at 3 (2003). 
 58. Id. 
 59. About Activities, INST. MED., 
http://www.iom.edu/Activities.aspx?search=%22food%20and%20drug%20admi
nistration%22 (search performed April 26, 2011). Disclosures of committee 
member conflicts of interest are only available for current projects, but not 
recently completed projects, so there may have in fact been more than three 
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Biomarkers and Surrogate Endpoints in Chronic Disease 
includes a Vice President at Merck & Co.60 The committee on 
Accelerating Rare Diseases Research and Orphan Product 
Development includes a former Vice President of Medtronic, 
Inc., and a former Senior Vice President of Pfizer.61 The 
committee on Review of the Food and Drug Administration’s 
Role in Ensuring Safe Food includes the Senior Vice President 
and Chief Scientific and Regulatory Affairs Officer of the 
Grocery Manufacturers Association.62 Clearly, individuals with 
industry background or connections are frequently deemed 
valuable and necessary for IOM committees to fulfill their 
functions, despite obvious conflicts of interest. Thus, it is not so 
rare that individuals with “unavoidable” conflicts of interest 
are included on IOM committees. 
In summary, IOM committees must be fairly balanced to 
perform their functions. They must include all essential areas 
of expertise, balance the biases and perspectives of their 
members, and disclose any unavoidable conflicts of interest. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF IOM’S 510(K) COMMITTEE 
The key question we pose is whether the existing IOM 
Committee on the Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 
510(k) Clearance Process has the appropriate representation to 
fulfill its mission and to satisfy the minimal requirements of 
FACA Section 15. The twelve-member committee is currently 
comprised of five physicians, three lawyers, and several 
academics with selected technical backgrounds.63 The 
recent committees involving disclosed conflicts of interest. 
 60. See Evaluation of Biomarkers and Surrogate Endpoints in Chronic 
Disease, INST. MED., http://iom.edu/Reports/2010/Evaluation-of-Biomarkers-
and-Surrogate-Endpoints-in-Chronic-Disease.aspx (last updated Feb. 4, 2011), 
for list of committee members. 
 61. See Accelerating Rare Diseases Research and Orphan Product 
Development, INST. MED., 
http://iom.edu/Activities/Research/OrphanProductResearch.aspx (last updated 
Jan. 25, 2011), for list of committee members. 
 62. See Review of the Food and Drug Administration’s Role in Ensuring 
Safe Food, INST. MED., 
http://iom.edu/Activities/Nutrition/FDARoleReview.aspx (last updated Sept. 
14, 2010), for list of committee members. 
 63. Committee: Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance 
Process, NAT’L ACADS. (Feb. 22, 2010) 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/CommitteeView.aspx?key=49181. Areas 
of technical expertise include orthopedic focused tissue engineering and 
software engineering. 
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Committee does not include: 
Innovators and inventors who have created new device 
products under current FDA systems; 64 
• Product developers who have brought products 
from concept to market through the FDA approval 
processes; 
• Entrepreneur
• Venture capitalists, investment bankers, or angel 
investors with experience financing new medical 
device innovations; 
• Individuals who routinely prepare 510(k) 
applications; 
• Management or o
medical device industry; or 
• Patients or patient advocates. 
To assess the adequacy of the Committee’s current 
composition, we look at the Committee’s function. FDA asked 
the Committee to address two critical questions: (1) does the 
current 510(k) process optimally protect patients and (2) does 
the current 510(
lic health?65 
The Committee was explicitly asked to provide 
recommendations as to how FDA can best optimize patient 
protection (i.e. minimize risks to patients) while also promoting 
innovation (i.e. improve the speed and affordability of access to 
innovative new products). To do this, the Committee must 
necessarily confront complex policy considerations, balance 
 64. One committee member, Dr. Lazar Greenfield, is credited with 
inventing the life-saving Greenfield vena cava filter. See Activity: Public 
Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process, INST. MED., 
http://www.iom.edu/Activities/PublicHealth/510KProcess.aspx (last updated 
Jan. 28, 2011). However, this invention was introduced in 1973, before there 
was separate regulation of medical devices by the FDA. See Ken Garber, The 
Clot Stopper, 22 INVENTION & TECHNOLOGY MAGAZINE (Summer 2006), 
available at 
http://beta2.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/it/2006/1/2006_1_34.shtm
l (describing the invention of the Kimray-Greenfield filter in the early 1970s 
and stating that “at the time, the Food and Drug Administration did not have 
to approve medical devices . . . “). The subsequent major changes to the 
Greenfield filter occurred after Boston Scientific acquired the device—and 
although Dr. Greenfield made suggestions to improve the filter’s design, it was 
Boston Scientific that navigated the FDA’s regulatory process. Cf. Ken Garber, 
supra (describing the company’s subsequent changes to the filter). 
 65. See Public Health Effectiveness, supra note 26. 
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competing objectives and address politically significant 
questions of patient autonomy, beneficence, and medical ethics. 
These include questions about when the patient should have 
the right to access some particular device despite known risks 
and under what circumstances the FDA should intervene to 
make that decision for the patient by barring access to the 
device. IOM’s charge also includes understanding how 
regulation impacts the complex innovation ecosystem. 
Innovation is more than just invention—it includes the entire 
cycle starting from invention, research and development, 
financing, manufacturing, marketing, and societal 
improvement.66 This requires an understanding of innovation, 
finance, entrepreneurship, product development and regulatory 
process. Consequently, the function of the IOM Committee is 
considerably more “diverse and far-reaching” than it is “narrow 
and specifi
rtise. 
Committee membership must have the expertise to answer 
both these questions. Unfortunately, it does not. First, it is 
evident that the Committee lacks some of the expertise needed 
to render advice on patient safety, an undoubtedly broad public 
issue that requires diverse representation, including 
representation from patients and industry. Those who invent, 
finance, develop, test, and manufacture medical devices have 
much needed expertise as to how to ensure the safety of those 
devices. They offer valuable perspectives on the types of 
research systems, manufacturing controls, testing strategies, 
and design processes that may enhance patient safety. These 
stakeholders, who are responsible for the invention, design, 
development, testing and regulatory approval or clearance of 
essentially all new devices in the United States, are omitted 
from the Committee. As discussed below, the committee also 
lacks any representation from patients— the ultimate 
stakeholde
ucts. 
Second, as discussed above, innovation is the 
transformation of an idea into a commercial product for the 
 66. See Larry Dignan, The Difference Between Innovation and Invention, 
ZDNET (Mar. 7, 2007, 9:09 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/the-difference-
between-innovation-and-invention/4610; see also William Buxton, Innovation 
vs. Invention, ROTMAN MAGAZINE, Fall 2005, at 52, 52 (“Innovation is far more 
about prospecting, mining, refining and adding value than it is about pure 
invention.”). 
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advancement of society. IOM cannot adequately address 
medical device innovation without insights from entrepreneurs 
and others who have been involved in the medical device 
industry— including people who have conceptualized products, 
designed and developed those products, obtained financing for 
new product lines, manufactured those products, and brought 
those products to market. Even the FDA has highlighted the 
importance of the medical device industry in innovation. In a 
presentation made to the annual meeting of the Food and Drug 
Law Institute, the Director of the FDA’s Center for Devices and 
Radiological Health (CDRH) explicitly recognized the vital role 
of industry in medical device innovation, stating, “U.S. medical 
device development and innovation is an ecosystem with 
shared responsibilities—to remain healthy it needs a strong 
device industry, a strong U.S. research system, and a strong 
FDA.”67  But the IOM committee lacks any member with this 
industry expertise. Without this experience, the committee 
cannot adequately assess the effects of FDA regulations on 
innovation. Indeed, this committee is precisely one for which it 
is crucial to have an “industrial” perspective to achieve an 
“informed, comprehensive, and authoritative understanding 
and analysis of the specific problem
onsidered by the committee.”68 
Furthermore, while the Committee includes individuals 
with expertise in clinical patient care, actual patients or 
patient advocates are conspicuously not represented on the 
Committee.  The patient is the ultimate stakeholder, the one 
most affected by policy decisions implicating safety and access 
to devices. Optimally balancing safety and risk with innovation 
raises important ethical questions of patient autonomy. 
Presumably, the patient should have some input as to when 
and how the FDA may regulate access to life-saving or life-
improving medical devices. But the committee includes no 
patient or patient advocate. This omission is confusing and 
difficult to justify. While the committee does include a number 
of physicians, they cannot speak for the patien
                                                          
 67. Jeffrey Shuren, 2011: The State of CDRH, Presentation at the Food 
and Drug Law Institute Annual Meeting (April 5–6, 2011) (presentation slides 
titute). available from the Food and Drug Law Ins
 68. NAT’L ACADS., supra note 48 at 3. 
 69. See Amir Halevy, Medical Futility, Patient Autonomy, and 
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Others have also noted these critical gaps in the 
Committee’s composition. The CDRH director recently testified 
before Congress that the Committee lacks inventors, 
innovators, financing experts, industry representatives, and 
actual patients.70 Various members of Congress have also 
expressed concern regarding these omissions, urging for more 
transparent processes and opportunities for substantive and 
meaningful input from all affected stakeholders.71 Thus, while 
each current committee member is individually impressive and 
has expertise worthy of inclusion on the committee, without 
this broader membership, the committee is inadequate to fulfill 
its mission. 
Additionally, this IOM committee lacks fair balance of 
perspectives. As previously noted, IOM committees can include 
individuals with preexisting biases, provided that there are 
also countervailing viewpoints on the committee. 
Unfortunately, the 510(k) Committee does not include this 
balance. For instance, one committee member spent almost 
twenty years at the national public interest law firm Public 
Citizen Litigation Group, whose motto is “Defending 
Democracy. Resisting Corporate Power.”72 Public Citizen is 
highly critical of the 510(k) process, asserting that medical 
devices are approved too quickly, allowing dangerous devices 
enter the market.73 While this member’s participation and 
viewpoint is certainly appropriate, the lack of an opposing 
viewpoint on the Committee renders the committee unbalanced 
and risks both perceived and actual bias. 
Professional Integrity: Finding the Appropriate Balance, 18 HEALTH MATRIX: 
J. L.-MED., 261 266 (2008) (“In both medical ethics and health law, patient 
autonomy has replaced medical paternalism as the dominant decision-making 
model.”); see also Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Compliance with Advance 
Directives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 133 & n.2 (2008) (explaining that “physician 
paternalism has been widely rejected”). 
 70. Impact of Medical Device Regulation on Jobs and Patients: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Jeffrey Shuren), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm243716.htm. 
 71. See Letter from Sen. John Kerry to Margaret Ann Hamburg, supra 
note 12. 
 72. PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org (last visited May 9, 2011). 
 73. Hines et al., supra note 26; Device and Diagnostic Policy, PUB. 
CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2505 (last visited May 9, 2011); 
Press Release, Public Citizen, FDA Dodges Responsibility Regarding Medical 
Device Approval, Defers to IOM: Statement of Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director, 
Public Citizen’s Health Research Group (Jan. 19, 2011), 
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3261. 
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Furthermore, IOM could have avoided the gaps in 
expertise and lack of balance by including any one of a number 
of highly qualified people, including current NAS members and 
past IOM committee members.74 IOM also could have looked 
beyond its membership to any one of a number of distinguished 
experts and leaders in the medical device field to obtain the 
required committee membership. IOM seemingly concluded in 
this instance that this critical expertise could not be obtained 
or was not needed, even though it has been necessary for many 
other IOM committees. Even if the necessary experts all had 
conflicts of interest, IOM could have simply disclosed these 
conflicts as it has done so many times before. IOM’s failure to 
do so has resulted in an incomplete and unbalanced committee, 
lacking the necessary expertise to fulfill its function and 
risking actual or perceived bias through a lack of balanced 
perspectives. 
These flaws threaten the integrity of the study and 
undermine all of the hard work this committee has performed. 
Ultimately, this committee fails to comply with FACA’s 
requirements and FDA is therefore statutorily forbidden from 
using any advice or reports this committee offers. 
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE A BALANCED 
COMMITTEE 
It is essential that the 510(k) Committee, as well as other 
government-commissioned IOM committees, are unbiased, 
balanced, include all necessary expertise, and comply with 
FACA requirements. A failure to include appropriate 
membership on IOM committees has significant implications 
for the FDA, IOM, and the general public. 
First, government agencies are expected to obtain complete 
and accurate information from a variety of perspectives before 
issuing regulations. The FDA is responsible for regulating the 
production and marketing of all foods, drugs, medical devices, 
cosmetics, and many other health products in the United 
States.75 Thus, the FDA has an enormous impact on the nation 
 74. See, e.g., supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
 75. The Importance of Public Comment to the FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143569.htm (last 
updated May 1, 2009). 
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and the public relies heavily upon its regulations. However, if 
the FDA uses information from incomplete or one-sided 
sources, not only might its ultimate decisions be uninformed, 
but the public will lose trust in the agency. If FDA wants to use 
IOM to analyze the 510(k) system, especially when 
contemplating controversial changes to the system, the IOM 
committee must include all necessary expertise and must be 
unbiased and objective. Otherwise, it is both irresponsible and 
illegal for FDA to use the IOM report, and FDA will risk losing 
its authority and credibility. 
Second, the value and quality of IOM’s work will suffer if 
its committees are unbalanced or lacking in crucial expertise. 
IOM is renowned for its thorough, robust, and objective 
research and prides itself on being independent and 
transparent. Its members are highly competent, respected, and 
experienced professionals in their fields. But IOM’s well-
deserved reputation and high caliber of its work product will 
deteriorate if there is perceived or actual bias or if it failed to 
include all critical perspectives. It is in IOM’s best interest to 
address this issue now, before it damages its own reputation. 
Third, if FDA can elect not to use official advisory 
committees (which are subject to stricter FACA requirements 
for public involvement and openness) and, instead, can rely on 
IOM committees with no such requirements, then FDA can 
completely circumvent FACA. FACA was enacted to increase 
transparency in government decision making. Allowing FDA to 
use IOM committees that are unaccountable to the public, the 
government, or even its own institutional policies, clearly 
contravenes FACA’s purpose. IOM committees must, at the 
very least, comply with the minimal legal requirements that 
apply to it. 
Finally, much of what the 510(k) committee does is secret 
already—deliberative meetings are closed, committee members’ 
resumes are not disclosed, and some material submitted to the 
committee is confidential. Additionally, IOM does not make its 
proposed recommendations available to the public for comment. 
Therefore, it is especially important for IOM to comply with the 
few openness and balance requirements under section 15. It is 
insufficient to only allow stakeholder participation in other 
steps of the process, such as data-gathering and reviewing. The 
committee needs members on the inside who can provide much-
needed perspectives and experience where it is currently 
lacking. Otherwise, critical expertise and viewpoints cannot be 
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considered in any meaningful way and any final report will 
have little credibility. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The IOM 510(k) committee’s purpose is to evaluate the 
510(k) pathway’s ability to advance medical device safety and 
innovation. This requires broad committee membership, 
including patients, inventors/innovators, entrepreneurs, 
financiers and industry. Furthermore, the committee must be 
fairly balanced to ensure its conclusions are objective and 
accurate and to maintain public trust and accountability. 
Unfortunately, the current committee does not contain all of 
the required areas of expertise and is not fairly balanced. IOM 
could have avoided these problems by simply including 
qualified experts in these fields as it routinely does for other 
committees, but it did not do so. 
We have no idea of what the IOM 510(k) committee report 
may say. We might agree with it or disagree it. Our concerns 
and conclusions are based on serious gaps in the committee 
composition, not any disagreement with the report content. 
Regardless of the committee’s final conclusions, the committees’ 
omission of necessary expertise and perspectives is cause for 
concern. Any committee reports and any of FDA’s subsequent 
actions will be plagued by real or perceived bias, lack of 
expertise and inaccuracy. 
To avoid these problems, FACA prohibits FDA’s use of this 
IOM committee. But we can’t unring a bell—once the 
committee issues its report, we will never know whether FDA 
saw it, read it, or used it. Anything FDA does thereafter can 
then be challenged by a stakeholder asserting a violation of 
FACA section 15. Thus, we should address this situation 
immediately. Until this matter is resolved, IOM should not 
issue any report from this committee. Otherwise, it will be 
placing FDA in an impossible position, while simultaneously 
damaging its own reputation for fairness, honesty, impartiality, 
and accuracy. 
Finally, the concerns raised here are not limited to only 
IOM’s 510(k) committee—expertise, fairness and balance are 
essential for all IOM committees. The public deserves nothing 
less. 
 
